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Title  
 
The pleasure of the holder: media art, museum collections and paper money 
 
Abstract 
 
When the artist Julian Rosefeldt exhibits video projections of cast Græco-Roman sculptures, 
exhibition-goers experience a crisis in resemblance and equivalence between a gallery installation and 
museum artefacts. On the face of it media magic seems to supersede, even eliminate, the experiential 
force of collection-holding. This article compares media and artefactual exhibiting practices by 
combining semiotic analysis, art theory and Georg Simmel’s sociology of money. In the late 18th 
century, as European museums began to display plaster reproductions of Classical sculpture and 
historic architectural details, economists worried that paper money would sever the representational 
force of monetary signifiers from the intrinsic value of the bullion they signify. Perhaps Rosefeldt 
defers promises like a banknote? Perhaps museums postpone the ‘pleasure of the holder’ like a bank 
reserve? In both cases, this article argues, the technologies of reproduction and repetition (old and new) 
tell us a great deal about the semantics of objects. 
 
1 21st century art and 18th century economics 
 
The British political economist David Ricardo (1772–1823) argued in the late 18th century, that the 
introduction of paper money would lead to uncontrollable fluctuations in the value of currency unless 
the scope to convert each ‘note’ into metal was, for the bearer of the new-fangled sheets of printed 
paper, executed on demand: that is, as Ricardo put it, ‘at a moment’s notice, according to the pleasure 
of the holder’ (Barry, 2007: 68). My theme is that the provisional attachment of value to a mediating 
material (such as paper), in requiring a written promise in order to take effect, offers interesting 
analogies with our enjoyment of media art when the technologies used by those artists are designed to 
replace, or even supersede, exhibition experiences based on artefactual presence. In this article I will 
explore what might be called a deferred conversion of aesthetic values occurring between immersive 
art installations and traditional museum display. The key to this exploration will be the debate about 
value and mediation in economics. Ricardo’s words allow us to consider black box wizardry from a 
perspective of the philosophy of money. It intrigues me a great deal that the magic worked by media 
technologies in exhibition contexts might involve an equivalent of a ‘promise to pay’, a postponing 
pledge to provide the specificity, tangibility and materiality of objecthood. I have a particular case in 
mind, and so will make no attempt to generalise from this example, but nonetheless suggest that the 
discussion that follows solicits a wider critical debate about arts and media aesthetics in relation to 
exhibiting procedures, especially those forms of display that have been developed through the 
collection-holding capacity of museums, places where artefactual presence is rather like a bullion 
reserve. 
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Figure 1. Video ‘walk-through’ of Julian Rosefeldt’s installation Asylum (2004). Courtesy of BALTIC 
Centre for Contemporary Art, Gateshead, UK. 
 
The online archive of the BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art includes a video ‘walk-through’ of 
Julian Rosefeldt’s 2004 installation Asylum (Baltic Library & Archive, 2004) (Figure 1). This artist's 
cinematic vision was experienced on foot and BALTIC’s visitors were required to move between nine 
free-hanging screens positioned at different angles throughout a large darkened gallery. Films of flower 
sellers, hospital catering staff and street prostitutes were projected into this space from every direction. 
Asylum is about immigrants in Berlin today and Rosefeldt is an artist who knows what it means to 
create art in this kind of affluent Western city, a condition that combines social critique with the 
production values of a media technologist. The results immerse the spectator in the kind of ‘black box’ 
experience generated by enclosed environments that are, like a cinema, only activated by projected 
moving images. It is crucial to my discussion that art galleries designed to house media art are, in 
effect, rooms without objects, exhibition spaces that cannot ‘hold’ collections. 
 
On one of Rosefeldt’s screens we see men of African origin standing amidst a collection of Græco-
Roman sculptures (Figure 2). The ethereal glow of what I take to be museum-quality plaster 
reproductions is striking, the effect makes a provocative comment on our collection-holding culture. 
The glowing plaster brings to mind the glass of milk that Johnnie (Cary Grant) brings to Lina (Joan 
Fontaine) in Alfred Hitchcock’s film Suspicion (1941). Famously, Hitchcock concealed a light in the 
milk to make Johnnie’s actions more menacing. Similarly, the unnatural luminosity of the casts could 
suggest toxic radiation. Rosefeldt's scenario is straightforwardly political. His immigrants inhabit our 
museum world as dislocated exiles and their proximity to the Antique, the public goal of many 18th 
and 19th century museum builders, does not inspire, it feels dangerous. One cannot help but think of 
European racism, perhaps even fascism. History has betrayed the confidence of our museum culture 
and, as a result, we are currently anxious about musealisation, not just of objects, but of whole 
environments. It would be detrimental to our ability to bestow value, so this debate goes, if everything 
that we hold in high regard eventually becomes ‘petrified memory’ (Müller, 1999). For this reason, 
museums have learnt to love interactive technologies in the same way that art galleries have embraced 
media art. In conjuring images of plaster casts within a black box environment, Rosefeldt reminds us 
just how much BALTIC is not built in the likeness of a traditional collection-holding institution, it 
represents the very opposite of a museum. 
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Figure 2. Projection screen showing a cast collection in the Asylum video. Courtesy of BALTIC Centre 
for Contemporary Art, Gateshead, UK. 
 
2 An ontological communion and a semiotic dislocation 
 
A nervousness about inherited likeness marks contemporary art. The power of the present erases any 
similarities to the past and mechanical reproduction overlays that which is reproduced. Perhaps our 
present time cannot emulate the museum world in the same way that BALTIC's grainy video cannot 
replicate the installation that visitors to Asylum actually encountered. Screen-based simulations seem to 
have eclipsed the fidelity of traditional reproductive techniques such as plaster casting. They have 
destroyed an ?ontological communion? by which we could once stand meaningfully amidst Græco-
Roman sculptures in academies and museums across Europe (Bann, 1996). Rosefeldt?s immigrants 
exemplify our own alienation from this tradition. 
 
Certainly, ours is an age dominated by the dislocating logic of semiotics, by the distinction between a 
sign and its referent, a difference that feels almost celebratory in the dislocation of the display of casts 
from the black box installation. However there is a degree of material intimacy in the casting process 
that confounds semiotic explanation. To make a plaster cast from a plaster mold involves some kind of 
sign function simply because there is an expectation that one thing can never be reproduced exactly 
like another. To exhaust the entire process of signification, the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839–1914) strove to define the different ways in which signs have ‘interpretants’. He noted that 
sometimes we are effortlessly struck by a sense of similarity and likeness (e.g. a cloud that resembles a 
human face), whereas on other occasions we have to summon a great deal of prior knowledge to 
decipher what is before our eyes (e.g. words written on a page). Likeness signs (icons) provide us with 
the most direct representations possible. As the literature on iconicity makes clear, our physical 
environment is full of things that remind us of other things. In contrast, Peirce tells us that we use 
highly conventionalised forms of signification (symbols) to engage with abstract ideas. In this latter 
category, because the arrangements can be as arbitrary as the communicating community desires, we 
are able to build sign on sign, notate abstract relations and disseminate ideas across groups of 
interpretants who share an understanding of the same language (Dorsett, 2011). It would seem that the 
technique of making plaster casts would fall into the former, rather the latter, category. 
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The casts in Rosefeldt’s video are the product of a mold, a mirroring of a negative in a positive form. 
This process creates an ongoing physical presence that is concrete enough to revive the lost authority of 
the original. Thus a sculpture has not just been reproduced to look like a sculpture, it also turns out to 
function as one as well (however inadequately, plaster surfaces are often lackluster). As a result, we are 
less likely to treat a collection of plaster casts as mediated objects, even though we know they are not 
the originals. Clearly casts can never be arbitrary enough to generate transformational effects: they 
represent, when it comes down to it, a type of petrification. Casting is therefore a matter of intimate 
surface contact and, as a result, it may be difficult to think of the process as a translational activity in 
the sense common to media or digital technology. Nevertheless, molds made from existing cast 
collections in European museums (routine practice in the 19th and early 20th centuries) display the 
kinds of degeneration one would expect when copies are made from copies. With cast sculpture 
degradation can be traced in the softening of detail and in an increase of seam lines caused by molding 
surfaces already marked with seams of their own. Here aesthetic value sharpens the signs of 
reproduction as it does those of creative origination. Traces of artisanal skill speak of the sculptor?s 
studio with the same force as an artist?s thumb-print.  
 
Sculptors do not expect the reproductive qualities of set plaster to bear any resemblance to those of the 
freshly mixed liquid handled by studio technicians. The sensuous weight of a bucket of plaster at the 
point it is ready to pour (just a little thicker than single cream) is very unlike the hardened matter that 
emerges when the mold is removed. Mixing plaster is everything and everywhere in the creation of 
large objects such as monumental sculptures. For example, modelled clay has to be cast into plaster for 
the foundry where the final bronze will be produced. In this sequence plaster plays the pivotal role in 
transforming the artist?s work into a permanent statue placed on a city street. The dusty residue left by 
plaster covers every surface in the various working environments the sculpture passes through on its 
journey to completion. At each stage this extraordinary casting material has little personality of its 
own, it simply takes on the characteristics of any surface it comes into contact with. Indeed, one could 
say that plaster displays an inherent inertness, a laziness that prevents it from maintaining its own 
qualities. This reproductive capacity has radical implications for our present-day dislike of inherited 
likeness, it involves prosthetic efficacy – in other words, it is not semiotic at all (Eco, 1997: 361-363). 
The phrase ?presented as a cast? (used in the refurbished Ashmolean Museum in Oxford when examples 
from its extensive collection of cast plaster reproductions are displayed alongside original Græco-
Roman sculptures) follows this idea by asking the viewer to ignore the mediating process of production 
and the exclusively reproductive medium used. 
 
3 Sculpture in the expanded field 
 
Therefore casting is a special kind of repetition, the original object is destined to return time and time 
again. Collection-holding is also an example of ongoing replication. When collected things are 
conserved and displayed, they remain themselves in a very emphatic way. I am reminded of an archive 
of photographs held by the Henry Moore Institute in Leeds which document the studio life of the 
monumental sculptor Thomas Mewburn Crook. As a young man he is busy carving a large reclining 
figure in marble. Many years later he sits besides the same sculpture: he has grown old but the 
sculpture has stayed put – presumably because it failed to be commissioned. And so, in this particular 
photographic archive, it is the object that remains crisply in focus, not the artist. Only the long-term 
storing away of things draws our attention to the inanimate in this way. The message here is that we do 
not need to treat every object in the world as if it is a hand grenade suspended in the seconds before it 
explodes. 
 
Whilst Crook is entirely at home amongst the sculptures in his studio, Rosefeldt’s immigrants stand 
uncomfortably amidst alien objects that have been collected and displayed in an alien land. The 
Africans have been relocated to a European museum, a forgotten world full of monumental Græco-
Roman sculptures that was consigned to oblivion by Rosalind Krauss in her influential essay Sculpture 
in the Expanded Field (1986). Whilst walking across open country towards a new earthwork by the 
sculptor Mary Miss she notes that ?surprising things’ have recently come to be called sculpture (Krauss, 
1986: 277). During the two decades preceding this publication Krauss had watched artists like Miss 
excavate subterranean passages, or walk across deserts (Richard Long), or physically cut buildings in 
half (Gordon Matta-Clark). The choice of sculptural site contrasted emphatically with the sedentary 
nature of the monumental tradition. And yet, as Krauss makes clear, these artists knew very well that 
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sculpture was a ?historically bounded category’. They were purposefully subverting the type of public 
statue that marks, as major museum buildings often do, the precise location where civic power exerts 
maximum authority over everyday metropolitan life. The significant fact to bear in mind here is that 
Krauss built her argument in favour of the expanded field around the creative crisis that followed the 
failure of August Rodin’s major public commissions. This was not simply a turning point in the 
sculptor’s career, it was also a watershed in the history of European art. After 1898 Rodin no longer 
believed that his memorial to Balzac would find a permanent site where it belonged in the Boulevard 
de Montparnasse, Paris. In Krauss’ account, from this key moment, the sculpture became a non-
sedentary object that could be shipped off to galleries anywhere in the world. The historic connection 
between a monumental statue and a significant civic location had been severed. Eventually, multiple 
versions of the Balzac figure would become ubiquitous representatives of this artist’s oeuvre in major 
art collections across the globe. This initiated new sculptural practices that, free of any obligation to 
what Krauss calls the logic of the monument, expanded to embrace the site-specific marking of 
locations, places made relevant by personal or artistic convictions rather than civic history.  
 
Interestingly, the disillusioned Rodin understood and accepted the change – he believed that Edward 
Steichan’s 1908 photograph of the Balzac statue, standing in his moonlit studio, captured the essence 
of his thinking as a sculptor. It is not just that this image shows a glowing plaster version of the statue 
waiting forever to be sent to the foundry, but also that, in the mind of this maker of monumental 
bronzes, a photographic print could be an equivalent of the object itself. Krauss? expanded field unfolds 
according to the logic of opposites, an exchange across a grid of opposing possibilities. If, for example, 
sculptors create imposing figures, elevated on hefty plinths in city centers, then they can also invent 
constructions that are not statues, have no elevation and are remote to any kind of civic space. Across 
this network of radical divergence, the emulative function of replication and repetition is negated, 
likeness is stalled. 
 
 
Figure 3. Blank screen in the Asylum video. Courtesy of BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art, 
Gateshead, UK. 
 
4 Inventorying efforts 
 
Rosefeldt’s approach to media art also seems to operate in the aesthetic space created by the failure of 
monumental sculpture. In the BALTIC’s video walk-through the darkened gallery and the archivist’s 
hand-held camera result in a low-grade experience that contrasts starkly with the contemporary artist’s 
dazzling cinematic installation. Whilst this short video has none of the production values of the artist’s 
film-making, it is surprising how well the impromptu recording captures the moment when one of the 
projections cuts out in order to restart (Figure 3). Amidst the flickering screens, an image suddenly 
disappears in the cavernous space. At this point hesitation prompts a level of disorientation more 
familiar in cinemas than galleries. When a film ends and the lights go up to reveal the environment in 
which we have been sitting, there is a momentary puncturing of spectoral engagement. Viewing 
Asylum involved a similar jolt into bewilderment. Once one screen had gone blank others rapidly 
followed suit leaving absolutely nothing to respond to until one’s semiotic faculties were able to 
engage with the gallery interior. Thus the viewer, now deprived of any secure basis for their 
spectatorship, was left with a sense of ruptured consciousness. The content of the installation 
disappeared, other gallery visitors looked strangely insentient and distorted, and an overwhelming 
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sense of blankness detached us from our capacity to comprehend. Viewers were, at this point, beyond 
the reach of Rosefeldt’s imagery but also aware of a type of experience excluded from BALTIC’s 
sense of black box aesthetics: the darkened room, its concrete floor, inactive light fittings, and so on – 
everything, that is, which was not a video projection (Dorsett, 2012). On reflection, I am inclined to 
treat this experience as uncharted semiotic territory. To the best of my knowledge, there is no critical 
literature (theoretical or otherwise) that accounts for the rupturing effect of extinguishing media magic 
in a black box environment. 
 
In contrast, the same is not true of artefactual presence in museums. In The Plates of the Encyclopedia 
(1989), Roland Barthes does describe an experiential blankness occurring through the ‘inventorying 
efforts’ of enlightenment figures such as Denis Diderot’s (1713-1784) who sought, in a museum-like 
way, a comprehensive knowledge of European material culture. The illustrations in Diderot’s 
Encyclopédie are divided into a lower section featuring equipment or raw material laid out in 
inventorial rows and an upper ‘vignette’ in which the same items are shown in use within lively scenes 
of human productivity or consumption (Figure 4). Barthes does not reproduce examples of these 
beautiful engravings but the compositional style developed by Diderot’s artists is familiar from 
countless instruction manuals and technical drawings. In the lower section it is as if a universe of 
disconnected mechanical parts exists independently of any obligation to a mechanistic whole. We are 
shown nothing but inventoried details – component after component, cog by cog. However, in the 
section above, we view the productive utilizations of parts; we see what happens when all manner of 
thing is gainfully employed in busy rooms or cavernous workshops. Diderot’s plates insist on the 
separation of these two domains. If one scans each illustration from bottom to top one follows a 
trajectory in which the material world is transformed into social and cultural significance. This is 
Barthes bottom-to-top perspective in which the world of mute objects is transformed into social and 
cultural meaning, swept up into the narrative of everyday use. However, in scanning from top to 
bottom, one descend through the realm of instrumental value into a zone of disconnected, non-
compliant ‘thinglyness’. Nothing makes sense anymore and the vignette above appears to be too full of 
meanings for its own good (Dorsett, 2011). 
 
 7 
 
 8 
Figure 4. ‘The Wheelwright’. Illustration from Encyclopedia, or a Systematic Dictionary of the 
Sciences, Arts, and Crafts, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, (1751–1772), Plate 1 
Vol. 3. Photograph by Chris Dorsett. Courtesy of the Taylor Institution Library, University of Oxford. 
 
When the projectors cut out in Rosefeldt’s installation the immersive magic of the black box 
environment was replaced by the ‘nuts and bolts’ interior of BALTIC Centre for Contemporary Art. 
Semiotic incoherence followed and this dislocation of meaning accords, I contend, with the subversive 
non-compliance of things in Barthes formulation. This is the main point of my article. The difference 
between black box immersion and artefactual presence is the over-narrated character of the former and 
the bewildering resistance of the latter. A sense of ontological dislocation (rather than communion) 
confirms the experience of having exhibited objects before one’s eyes; a value that collection-holding, 
like the casting process, reproduces again and again over extended periods of time. Indeed, long-term 
collecting, in its inventorying of once-animate objects, may be the closest we can get to being outside 
of our own skins, outside the confines of performativity. I speculate that the cinematic blankness 
experience in Rosefeldt’s installation offers a way of thinking about the special value of exhibition 
environments that have been dedicated to durational engagements with artefacts.  
 
5 The semiotics of paper money 
 
In Georg Simmel’s The Philosophy of Money (2004) the mediating value of paper money noted by 
Ricardo becomes entwined in the issue of artefactual presence. Once again, Rodin plays the key role. 
Simmel believed that this sculptor’s radical use of oscillating modelled surfaces, and the vibrating 
physicality of the resulting bronzes, embodied transformation and movement. His sculptures captured 
both the flux of modern life and, by implication, the loss of all that is solid and secure in contemporary 
economies. David Frisby, in his preface to the third edition of Simmel’s book (2004), notes the 
philosopher-sociologist’s ‘ingenious eye for relationships and intermediate spaces’, an inclination that 
makes him ‘predestined to see money as the relation of relations’ (Frisby, 2003: xvii). The notion of an 
autonomous cultural sphere with its own ‘immanent developmental logic’ is, for Simmel, Marx’s 
conception of commodity fetishism, where everything is no more than the ‘semblance’ of exchange 
and circulation (Frisby, 2003: xxv). Thus financial transaction enters a state of perpetual uncertainty 
because the actual value of what is exchanged does not match the appearance of the symbolic currency. 
The sphere of paper money acquires an autonomy in which exchange ‘is not the mere addition of two 
processes of giving and receiving’ but an end in itself (Frisby, 2003: xix).  
 
Semiotically speaking, this emergent phenomenon is a ‘symbolic’ value in the particular sense meant 
by Peirce. The pioneering semiotician’s thinking was very much along the same lines as Simmel. 
Certain signs fall into a relational category that embraces the autonomy of a constructed language, a 
category that escapes the requirement of an irrefutable point of reference in the concrete world. As we 
learnt above, the type of sign that Peirce called the ‘symbolic’ involves knowledge that can only be 
acquired through particular forms of socio-cultural immersion (family, community, education, and so 
on). Such signs are always based on agreed (or enforced) convention and so have to be learnt rather 
than cultivated within our perceptual experiences. Here the referential significance between a sign and 
its object is always a matter of interchangeable equivalence. As a result, there is a continual inventing 
of signs out of other signs that parallels the financial autonomy created by the deferred ‘promise’ found 
in currency systems. Simmel pictures it as a perpetual motion machine. What was once a bartering of 
objects, or precious metals such as gold, has been objectified as a pure act of exchangeability. As 
Frisby observes, our participation in a money economy necessitates entering a sphere of circulation in 
which Simmel believes we are forever distanced from the world of objects by a dynamic mediator of 
value (Frisby, 2003: xviii). 
 
The continual oscillation of the modern financial environment, was for Simmel already evident in 
Rodin’s sculptural practices. That this artist was chosen to represent such an acute critique of the social 
construction of monetary value is a powerful driver for this article. Steichan’s photograph of the failed 
Balzac commission showed us that a temporary plaster sculpture defers the permanence of a bronze 
statue and that a moonlit studio suspends the hard daylight of the Parisian street for which it was 
intended. In the photograph the rejected work is oscillating with instability: soon it will be touring to 
different museums and galleries, sold in editions to private and public collectors, and placed on public 
exhibition in a manner closer to contemporary installation art than museum display. Following Rodin’s 
example, one might wonder how media artists like Rosefeldt could ever negotiate the possibility of 
stable value. Viewing Asylum is like Thomas Hardy’s Tess and Angel who, whilst fleeing the police on 
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a pitch-black moonless night, can only sense, rather than know, that they are near the brooding 
hugeness of Stonehenge (Hardy, 1992). It is something like this powerful artefactual presence that 
Rosefeldt’s installation defers. The physicality of the cast sculptures sits out of sight, at a distance, like 
reserve bullion. 
 
Ricardo argued that our participation in a modern economy entails a promise – the ‘bearer’ must be 
able to, at some point, receive precious metal on demand. Paper can only be money if our handling of 
banknotes is a authorized action. The promise to pay ‘at a moment’s notice’ has to convince every 
person using the currency that they could, if they want to, end up with the designated amount of gold. 
For this reason the guarantee has to be serious (an example would be the early pound notes printed in 
colonial North America which carry the warning: ‘to counterfeit is death’). Thus the printed promise to 
pay, even when the bearer knows that it is indefinitely postponed and an end in itself, can only realize 
its meaning through the action of using the note. The oldest form of paper money, the Ming Dynasty 
circulating treasure note, was in effect a written ‘speech act’ by which, according to an influential 
theory from J. L. Austin (1911–1960), declared actions generate meaning entirely within their own 
linguistic utterance. The examples offered by Austin (‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth’,‘I give 
and bequeath my watch to my brother’, and so on) do not describe what is being done, the words 
actually make it happen (Austin, 1976: 4-7). Thus the financial promise to pay the bearer on demand is 
a textual declaration in which the pledge is accepted as a ‘semblance’ (Simmel’s word). We accept that 
the realization will be forever deferred, eclipsed in favour of the vertiginous pleasures of on-going 
exchange and the continuous circulation of value. Here Simmel looked beyond the convenience of 
printed currency to identify unprecedented opportunities for autonomy within financial processes; that 
is, for money to make more money (Frisby, 2003: xxv). The semblance that generates this autonomy is, 
of course, a continual repetition of the promise, not the pay off. Think of the two lovers in Bruno 
Latour’s example of Austin’s concept (Latour, 2010). As long-term partners the couple declare their 
affection to one another again and again, day after day, year after year. Despite the banality of the 
endlessly repeated ‘I love you’ the response is never ‘you have told me this a hundred times before’ 
because the lovers are using. As Latour explains ‘forms of speech that are evaluated not by their 
correspondence with any state of affairs but by the quality of the interaction they generate in the way 
they are uttered’ (Latour, 2010: 102). Simmel celebrated this kind of performativity in our financial 
sphere and Kevin Barry (2007), an historian of Victorian literature, claims that the desire to create 
fictional realities in the arts is linked to the deferred ‘promise to pay’ propagated by the advent of paper 
pounds in the 18th century English-speaking world. The provocative irony of the artist J. S. G. Boggs 
seems to fulfil the creative potential Barry is describing. Ricardo would have been appalled by the 
uncontrollable level of financial fluctuation generated by Boggs as he creates detailed drawings of US 
banknotes in order to buy air tickets and pay hotel bills. His practices result in transactions that have, 
on occasions, led to the artist receiving real money as change (Velthuis, 2002). Clearly counterfeiting 
now leads to artistic fame rather than capital punishment in North America. Thus both paper money 
and contemporary artworks sever the representational force of a signifier from the intrinsic value of 
that which is signified and, for Barry, the Modernist cannon is founded on a perpetual distancing of the 
fictional from the actual. 
 
The concept of semblance, as employed in everyday English, confuses Peirce’s separation of icon from 
symbol. To point out that reality is different from appearances introduces arbitrariness into a sign 
function that should really be a straightforward matter of awoken familiarity, of re-semblance. 
Nevertheless, the term works very well when applied to the actual experience of viewing Asylum. 
Rosefeldt’s screen-based installation detached ocular-centric appearances from the space in which the 
projections were viewed. His approach accepts that a media representation necessarily entails a loss of 
attention in relation to the non-technological world that surrounds and contains the artwork. The 
inanimate environment is eclipsed by the animate mediation, actuality is replaced by fiction. In this 
sense, a special kind of promise experienced by all exhibition-goers is indefinitely withheld.  
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Figure 5. ‘An Antiquary’s Billiard Table’. Courtesy of the Pitt Rivers Museum, University of Oxford. 
 
6 Numismatic extinction: a conclusion 
 
Augustus Henry Lane Fox Pitt-Rivers (1827-1900), founder of a celebrated museum in Oxford, 
understood the value of immersing himself in the presence of large quantities of objects. There is a 
photograph of his billiard table covered with specimens (Figure 5). It shows the chaotic sorting and 
grouping of future exhibits. Perhaps this informal assemblage of archeological specimens shows the 
‘inventorying efforts’ of Pitt-Rivers in progress. One can imagine the collector’s eyes sweeping across 
individual items, noting similarities, improvising possible combinations, speculating on how emerging 
typologies demonstrate theories. A cluster of glass vessels at the back of the table and a pile of stone 
tools at the front, like the ethnological objects that crowd the cases in his museum, become examples of 
a preponderance of similar forms of production, manufacture and use – perhaps evidence of the 
survival of the fittest technologies, the Darwinian paradigm which is said to have influenced Pitt-
Rivers’ approach to material culture. Here a Barthes-like bottom-to-top theoretical speculation wants to 
ascend vertiginously above the non-compliance of recumbent things. These are speculations informed 
by multi-sensory experiences – we touch surfaces, we ‘handle’ a shape, sense its weight. Making 
meaning is, in this sense, straightforwardly a matter of holding things and learning from this 
experience. The handling process enables types of vignette that are particular to the liveliness of 
museum life. The process weaves together new equivalences between things that would never occur to 
anyone outside the collection-holding environment. In the process of arranging and comparing objects, 
in scanning one cluster after another, one’s attention is drawn to certain things rather than others. 
Perhaps a nearby tall object is noticed because there is another tall item at the other end of the table. 
Thus an overlapping property can take us beyond our established taxonomic procedures. Indeed, 
collection-holding can generate coincidences and commonalities that do not exist outside the museum. 
 
Such overlaps play key role in Douglas Hofstadter’s Fluid Concepts and Creative Analogies: computer 
models of the fundamental mechanisms of thought (1997). The origins of this book are in computer 
science research where analogy construction is a way of understanding human cognition and the kind 
of computational processes needed to model artificial intelligence. Hofstadter uses everyday items 
spread across a table for his experiments. This is not so different from a collector noting likeness (cups 
go with other cups) and the results of his research demonstrate the mental capacity we have to 
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recognize equivalence (the tall cup in this group goes with the tall glass in that group). As artefacts are 
grouped, vignettes fall into place – this is ‘the pleasure of the holder’, of collection-holding. Pitt-Rivers 
sorted many table-loads of items in order to accumulate the collection now on display in Oxford. His 
aim was to map (demonstrate similarities and equivalents) human innovation in the widest geographic 
and historical contexts. The museum environment he created is very dark but does not generate 
anything like a black box encounter: the multitude of objects he brought together is emphatically 
present even though every item has been relieved of its duty to provide meaningful solutions to life’s 
many problems (how to lock a door, how to trap a mouse, how to cast a spell, how to shrink a head). 
As one would expect, the numismatic dimension of Pitt-Rivers’ activities offers an extraordinary 
survey of pre-industrial and modern modes of financial exchange. There are bartered objects and lumps 
of precious metal, string money from the Pacific island of New Caledonia, woven braid made of hair 
from the ear of a fruit bat, and safety pins that were used as small change in Oxford market. Both 
Ricardo and Simmel would have learnt a great deal here. The knowledge stored at the Pitt Rivers is an 
attribute of both conventional museum typology and the power we have, following taxonomic 
processes of the kind we saw on the billiard table, to discern new equivalences between things on 
display. This latter capacity is a product of the abiding ‘thinglyness’ of collecting. Nevertheless, a high 
degree of non-compliance is built into this entirely artefactual procedure. The provisional nature of all 
curatorial decisions stay clearly in sight, the resistance of collected objects is not withheld from view. 
The kind of semiotic disruption experienced as the projected images disappeared in Rosefeldt's 
installation is encountered readily, and without contradiction. The items held in the Pitt Rivers Museum 
will always outlive the associations and links that the curators identify. This is the pay off - a reality 
check is not simply promised, it is built into the fabric of the experience. Thus the durational 
understanding of objects we gain through a lifetime of movement in and out of a museum environment 
such as the Pitt Rivers is built upon the way objects stay put, the way the displays stop us reducing the 
value of an exhibition to the process of mediation. It is significant that the critique of musealisation is 
built on the assumption that the inanimate nature of a collection is a negative property, it is as if 
museum accession can only destine objects for extinction. 
 
Genomics experts talk about 'junk' DNA in the same way I am writing about institutionalised 
collection-holding (Dorsett, 2013). To begin with, scientists thought that the presence of non-coding 
sequences in the human genome was something of a mystery. The inactive parts were, perhaps, a 
residue (dangerous because unpredictable) or an archive from which (more hopefully) new 
generational strategies for survival could be drawn when needed. A further interpretation was that the 
genome itself needs inactive gaps in order for the coding parts to be read. As a result, in the right kind 
of critical debate, analogies could be made with the types of reserve collection we associate with the 
development of our museum culture. This possibility, to my mind at least, links Pitt-Rivers’ Darwinism 
to the futuristic tilt of synthetic biology. Is a museum like a frozen zoo? Certainly scientists think that 
genetic technologies could, at some future point, extract DNA from museum specimens in order to 
bring extinct creatures back to life. Just imagine the implications for all the biological material we 
preserve (especially religious relics and medical specimens). Such thoughts, too far-fetched for this 
kind of article, nevertheless remind us that inactivity can shape the active world. By comparing the 
archival significance of DNA for science and the experimental values of reserve collections for every 
type of exhibition-maker, we could initiate rewarding debates about the value of objects currently 
regarded as inert, perhaps even inconsequential, because they are ‘in reserve’ – a scenario with 
implications for our assumptions about the inherited past. 
 
It will be clear by now that the discussion in this article is entirely provisional. My thinking about 
gallery installations and museum collections has encompassed a motley range of explanatory 
disciplines: the semiotics of Peirce and Barthes, the sociology of Simmel, the philosophy of language 
developed by Austin, the museological practices of Pitt-Rivers, and the far-reaching art criticism of 
Krauss. The original impetus for the article, a DeSforM conference on the continuing significance of 
objects for industrial designers (i.e. product semantics), underlines the degree to which this association 
and combination of ideas is focused on conversations with practitioners and theorists from many 
different disciplines. Indeed, my conversations with economists and geneticists suggest that room 
needs to be made for cross-disciplinary negotiations in the widest spheres of theoretical research. On 
the face of it I have been proposing the parameters for this discussion on a simplistic analogy between 
cultural collection-holding and state gold reserves but why assume that black box magic replaces, or 
drives into obsolescence, the powerful presence of artefacts? Instead, why not think of the process of 
exhibiting media art as a promise? Black box installations are not at variance with the intrinsic value of 
‘things’, they simply postpone our encounters with the ‘actual’ non-performative world. 
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